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Articles 
HUCH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.:  
CONSUMER PREY, CORPORATE PREDATORS, 
AND A CALL FOR THE DEATH OF THE 
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT DOCTRINE DEFENSE 
John E. Campbell* & Oliver Beatty** 
“[These laws] come[] from an order of men, whose interest is 
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have 
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, 
and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both 
deceived and oppressed it.” 
-Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations1 
 
“[T]he nature of any human being, certainly anyone on Wall 
Street, is the better deal you give the customer, the worse deal 
it is for you.” 
-Bernard Madoff2 
                                                 
* John Campbell, a former high school inner-city teacher, is now the manager of the 
consumer law and class action department at The Simon Law Firm, P.C.  He serves as an 
adjunct professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, teaching Civil Practice.  John 
graduated from Saint Louis University in 2006, magna cum laude.  He was co-author of the 
briefing regarding Huch v. Charter, a case discussed herein, and argued the case before the 
Missouri Supreme Court.  John was recognized in 2010 as one of the “Most Influential 
Appellate Attorneys” in Missouri. 
** Oliver Beatty, a former advocate for Latino Cultural Center of Purdue University, is a 
recent graduate of the Saint Louis University School of Law.  During his tenure he served 
as an editor for the Saint Louis University Law Journal Board, member of the National Trial 
Team, and had his own Dear Oliver humor/advice column, much to the demise of the 
student body. 
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
288 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776). 
2 See The Future of the Stock Market, PHILOCTETES (Oct. 20, 2007, 2:30 PM), 
http://philoctetes.org/event/the_future_of_the_stock_market (providing Bernard 
Madoff’s statements during a panel discussion at the Philoctetes Center, including his view 
that “when you take the human being out of the equation, you solve your regulatory 
problems because the nature of any human being, certainly anyone on Wall Street, is the 
better deal you give the customer, the worse deal it is for you”). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If a cashier gives you too much change at the store, you give it back.  
That is what most of our parents taught us; they taught us it was the 
right thing to do, but our parents had never heard of the voluntary 
payment doctrine (“VPD”).  The VPD is an ancient equitable defense that 
leaves most attorneys scratching their heads;3 and until recently, it posed 
an imminent threat of gutting many consumer protection laws by 
allowing companies to retain money from unsuspecting consumers who 
paid due to the companies’ mistakes, or in some cases, outright fraud. 
The VPD states that, absent fraud or duress, one who makes a 
voluntary payment with full knowledge of all material facts is not 
entitled to recover the payment.4  This sounds benign enough; however, 
in recent times, some companies have attempted to distort the VPD into 
a rule that allows companies to reap tremendous windfalls by collecting 
illegal payments and then arguing that those who paid should be barred 
from recovering their money.5  Under the version of the VPD that 
companies sought to create, if the clerk gave a purchaser too much 
money in return, then the purchaser could keep it.  When the store 
sought a refund, that person could keep the money even though she did 
not deserve it, because the clerk had given her too much change with full 
knowledge of the facts in the absence of fraud or duress.  Companies 
seized upon the VPD and argued that it applied even if the company 
took affirmative steps to induce payments by a consumer who was not 
obligated to make such payments.6  Courts applied this doctrine even if 
the company engaged in consumer fraud.7  As a result, the VPD posed a 
very real threat to the effectiveness of consumer fraud acts. 
                                                 
3  See generally Bilbie v. Lumley, (1802) 2 East 469 (1802 ER 448) (establishing this rule in 
England in the 1800s). 
4 See, e.g., Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 416 (1863) (“[T]he plaintiffs paid the 
money with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, and well knowing that 
they were under no legal obligations to pay it.  It must, therefore, be regarded as a 
voluntary payment, and not a payment under duress.”) 
5 See, e.g., King v. First Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1171 (Ill. 2005); Harris 
v. ChartOne, 841 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. 
Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 23 (Wash. 2007). 
6 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 891–93 (Ind. 2004) (noting 
that Warner took affirmative steps to induce payments through late fee provisions, which 
Warner argued constituted valid liquidated damage clauses); Eisel v. Midwest Bankcentre, 
230 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (arguing that the voluntary payment doctrine 
barred plaintiffs’ recovery because they voluntarily paid document preparation fees); Pratt 
v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (asserting the VPD defense to bar 
plaintiff’s recovery after voluntarily paying an invoice). 
7 See Time Warner, 802 N.E.2d at 893; Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 339–40. 
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Although the VPD had equitable justifications and had roots 
reaching back almost 400 years,8 it threatened to become a tool of 
inequity.  This rise of the VPD, corresponding with an era marked by 
corporate fraud, posed serious concerns for the orderly functioning of 
the marketplace.  Although the VPD had become largely extinct in the 
mid-twentieth century, courts began to examine the VPD anew in the 
1990s and early 2000s,9 and based on those decisions, the VPD showed 
some signs of rising from the proverbial ashes.  The trend began when a 
string of decisions relating to cable companies recognized the VPD as a 
defense to excessive late fees.  Multiple state supreme courts held that 
the doctrine could serve as a bar to recovery in at least some cases.  
Simultaneously, a host of other courts reiterated that the VPD was a 
viable defense, perhaps even to consumer class actions.10 
The wave of pro-business VPD decisions reached full swell in Huch 
v. Charter Communications, Inc. (“Huch I”).  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Eastern District held that the VPD allowed Charter, a 
cable company, to keep charges that it collected for merchandise that 
people never requested.11  The procedural posture of the case was 
especially interesting:  The trial court granted a motion to dismiss.  This 
meant that, even though the trial court took the plaintiffs’ allegations—
that Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”) illegally billed for 
unsolicited merchandise in violation of specific Missouri laws 
prohibiting such behavior—as true, the VPD still served as a complete 
bar to recovery.12  Indeed, defendants in other cases immediately cited 
the affirmation by the appellate court as a reason to throw a number of 
claims out of court.13  The decision meant that even in the face of fraud 
and illegal profit, consumers could lose the right to recover if they did 
not detect the fraud and refuse to pay immediately.  For a bleak moment, 
it appeared the VPD would rise as a justification for corporate theft and 
negligence precisely when consumer remedies were most needed to help 
rebuild waning consumer confidence, and in doing so, it would become 
a powerful defense to many consumer fraud claims regarding tacking on 
of charges, cramming, illegal renewal, and a host of other forms of 
                                                 
8 See generally Bilbie, 2 East 469. 
9 See supra note 5 (providing cases where courts examined the VPD anew in the early 
2000s). 
10 See supra note 5 (presenting cases involving courts that recognized the VPD as a viable 
defense). 
11 Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Apr. 15, 2008). 
12 See id. (holding that the trial court did not err in granting Charter’s motion to dismiss, 
as the VPD barred recovery). 
13 E.g., Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1222 (D. Nev. 2010). 
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consumer fraud.  If the story ended with Huch I, this would be a bleak 
Article for those who advocate for vigorous consumer protection. 
In Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc. (“Huch II”), however, the en 
banc Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court and fully 
discussed the collision between the VPD and modern consumer fraud 
statutes.14  The court held that the VPD does not apply to Missouri’s 
unfair deceptive acts and practices (“UDAP”) statute, known as the 
Merchandising Practices Act.15  The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision 
is seminal, and subsequent courts around the country are already citing 
it.16  However, the VPD’s future is not fully written.  This Article argues 
for the adoption of Huch II reasoning throughout the country, allowing 
for the continued eradication of the VPD from modern consumer 
jurisprudence. 
In Part II, this Article addresses the history of the VPD, including its 
roots in England.  Part III discusses the likely trajectory of the VPD both 
in the United States and internationally.  In conclusion, Part IV addresses 
the public policy concerns that require the VPD to be fully eliminated 
from consumer jurisprudence, thereby fully adopting the logic of a 
previous court, which stated that “[s]uch a rule . . . could become a 
mighty instrument of evil, and might . . . be used to defend against all 
manner of thefts and larceny and the illegal frittering away of the public 
money.”17 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE VPD 
A. England 
America inherited the VPD from England in its early history.  It is 
closely related to the mistake of law doctrine,18 and in many states today, 
the VPD is only available as a defense when the mistake that induced 
                                                 
14 See Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) 
(addressing VPD and its applicability to a violation of the Merchandising Practices Act). 
15 Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.1129 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
16 See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–23; Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 691 
S.E.2d 203, 206–07 (Ga. 2010). 
17 Lamar Twp. v. City of Lamar, 169 S.W. 12, 16 (Mo. 1914) (citing Sheldon v. S. Sch. Dist. 
in W. Soc. of Suffield, 24 Conn. 88 (1855)); see Norton v. Marden, 15 Me. 45 (1838); City of 
Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425 (Md. 1846); Preston v. City of Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 
7, 13 (Mass. 1831); Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
18 See Duncan Sheehan, The Origins of the Mistake of Law Bar in English Law 8 (Univ. of E. 
Anglia Norwich Law Sch., Working Paper No. NLSWP 08/01, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113723 (providing a complete discussion of the development of 
the mistake of law doctrine—including its relationship to the VPD—in England). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/6
2012] Death of the VPD 505 
payment was one of law, rather than fact.19  A mistake of law occurs 
when a party is “ignoran[t] of a rule or principle of law or [reaches] an 
erroneous conclusion as to the operation of the law upon a known set of 
facts.”20 
In English law traceable to the 1600s, there was no distinction 
between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact.  A person who paid 
money under a mistake of law or fact was generally able to seek recovery 
in an action called indebitatus assumpsit.21  It was not until 1802, in Bilbie v. 
Lumley, that Lord Ellenborough indicated that a mistake of law that 
induced payment would not allow for the recovery of money paid with 
full knowledge of all facts.22  This maxim was imported from England’s 
criminal law, where a defendant’s ignorance of the illegality of his 
conduct was no defense. 23  Lord Ellenborough reasoned that a party 
should not be able to recover an amount paid simply because his 
ignorance of the law induced the payment.24  His concern was that 
parties who have made payments will seek the courts’ assistance in 
recovering those payments once they learn that there was no legal 
obligation to pay.  In Lord Ellenborough’s words, “[e]very man must be 
taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what 
extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried.  It would be urged in 
almost every case.”25 
Bilbie proved to be a turning point.  The English cases that followed 
Bilbie continued to allow recovery of payments when they were made 
under mistake of fact or induced by fraud or duress, but precluded 
recovery if the mistake was one of law.  For example, in Kelly v. Solari, 26 
agents of the insurance company had forgotten that the defendant’s 
policy had lapsed because a premium had gone unpaid, and the plaintiff, 
a director of a life insurance company, made payment on the policy 
                                                 
19 See Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 416 (1863) (citing multiple state cases where 
plaintiffs were denied recovery because the mistake that induced payment was not a 
mistake of law, even though the various plaintiffs made the payment with a full knowledge 
of all the facts and circumstances). 
20 27 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:123 (4th ed. 2003). 
21 LAW REFORM COMM’N, COMMUNITY LAW REFORM PROGRAM:  ELEVENTH REPORT—
RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW 53, § 2.2–2.3 (1987), available 
at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R53TOC. 
22 (1802) 2 East 469, 470–72. 
23 The rule is often stated as follows:  ignorantia legis non excusat, or “ignorance of the law 
is no excuse.”  See, e.g., Beck v. Thompson & Maris, 4 H. & J. 531, 533 (Md. 1819) (citing 
Bilbie, 2 East at 471). 
24 See Bilbie, 2 East at 471–72. 
25 Id. at 472. 
26 (1841) 9 M. & W. 54, 54. 
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under the mistake of fact. 27  The court held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover.28  The court took a firm stance, stating that “it is in every case 
unconscientious to retain money paid under a mistake of fact.”29 
B. The United States 
Even though some justices found the principle laid out in Bilbie 
controversial, it was eventually adopted in the New World.30  For better 
or for worse, the distinction between a mistake of fact (for which 
restitution could be sought) and a mistake of law (for which restitution 
could not be sought) began to appear in the United States.31  In Missouri, 
for example, the VPD emerged during the Civil War in the case of Claflin 
v. McDonough in 1863.32  In Claflin, the plaintiffs paid a city tax collector 
the full amount demanded under threat that they would be indicted if 
they did not pay.33  The Missouri Supreme Court articulated the VPD as 
follows:  “[A] person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge 
of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot 
recover it back, though the payment is made without a sufficient 
consideration, and under protest.”34  Based on this articulation, the court 
held that the plaintiffs were barred from recovering the overpayment.35 
Although decisions like Claflin were not uncommon, even during 
this early period, courts in some states opposed the VPD.  For example, 
Kentucky and Connecticut rejected the doctrine from the outset.36  Under 
Connecticut common law any time a party obtained money that it was 
not owed, that money should be disgorged.37  The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut held in Northrop v. Graves: 
[W]e mean distinctly to assert, that, when money is paid 
by one, under a mistake of his rights and his duty, and 
which he was under no legal or moral obligation to pay, 
and which the recipient has no right in good conscience 
to retain, it may be recovered back, in an action of 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 57. 
30 See Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 57–58 (1838); Hunt v. 
Rousmanier’s Adm’rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174, 211–12, 215–16 (1823). 
31 See, e.g., Beck v. Thompson & Maris, 4 H. & J. 531, 533 (Md. 1819). 
32 33 Mo. 412 (1863). 
33 Id. at 414. 
34 Id. at 415. 
35 Id. at 416. 
36 Northrop’s Ex’rs v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 560 (1849); Underwood v. Brockman, 39 Ky. 
(4 Dana) 309, 319–20 (1836). 
37 See Northrop’s Ex’rs, 19 Conn. at 548. 
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indebitatus assumpsit, whether such mistake be one of fact 
or of law; and this we insist, may be done, both upon the 
principle of Christian morals and the common law.38 
Connecticut’s outright rejection was the exception, not the rule.  
Many states and courts adopted the VPD, allowing recovery only when 
there was a mistake of fact, fraud, or duress.39  However, courts routinely 
wrestled with the day-to-day inequities the VPD could create.  In fact, 
courts became so adept in promulgating many exceptions and 
qualifications that some observers noted that “[o]ne more often 
encounters the ‘luxuriant undergrowth of exceptions to the general rule’ 
than applications of the rule itself.”40  The three exceptions articulated by 
courts were:  mistake of fact, fraud, and duress. 
1. Mistake of Fact 
The line between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact is a blurry 
one, and the distinction is often painfully difficult to elucidate.41  As 
discussed above, a payor’s mistake about a fact material to the payment 
will preclude the voluntary payment defense,42 since the payor did not 
make the payment voluntarily.43  A mistake of fact occurs where a party 
possesses “unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of” a material fact.44 
                                                 
38 Id. at 554.  The Northrop court was generally concerned that the distinction between a 
mistake of law and a mistake of fact promoted form over substance.  Id.  When discussing 
maxims such as “every man is bound, and therefore ‘presumed, to know the law,’” the court 
stated: 
These [maxims], and all other general doctrines and aphorisms, when 
properly applied to facts and in furtherance of justice, should be 
carefully regarded; but the danger is, that they are often pressed into 
the service of injustice, by a misapplication of their true meaning.  It is 
better to yield to the force of truth and conscience, than to any 
reverence for maxims. 
Id. at 553–54. 
39 See Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 81 (Ala. 1827); Mayor of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 
425, 436–37 (Md. 1846); Robinson v. City Council of Charleston, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 317, 319 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1846); Lewis v. Cooper, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 467, 473–74 (1814). 
40 LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 21, at 53, § 1.3 (footnote omitted). 
41 See Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and 
Defending the Distinction 11 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008), 
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/SimonsMistake 
ofFact.html. 
42 Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412 (Mo. 1863). 
43 Wheeler v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 91 N.W. 890, 890 (Minn. 1902). 
44 Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 79 N.W. 762, 763 (Wis. 1899) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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For example, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Nix, the defendant-policy 
holder misrepresented to the plaintiff-insurance company that her 
husband’s injury was not employment-related, as he had fallen off a 
horse on his personal time.45  Had the husband’s injury arisen out of 
employment, the defendant and plaintiff’s health insurance contract 
would not have covered his medical expenses.46  The insurance company 
paid out on the policy and then brought suit to recover the payments, 
claiming it was mistaken as to whether the defendant’s husband was 
injured within the scope of employment, and thus whether payment was 
owed under the contract.47  Consistent with the VPD, the court held that 
because the insurance company’s payments were induced by its 
mistaken belief about the circumstances of the husband’s injury, the 
insurance company was entitled to recover.48  Similar to the Nix case, 
taxes paid under a mistake of fact have often been held recoverable by 
the taxpayer.49 
2. Fraud 
A look at early American cases demonstrates that the VPD was not 
intended to allow intentional wrongdoers to profit from their illegal 
actions.50  Courts almost immediately recognized that the fraud 
exception was a broad protection, which applied even when no common 
law fraud had occurred.51  Indeed, early recitations of the VPD make 
clear that the “fraud” exception was shorthand, intended to cover a wide 
range of wrongdoing, often designated as “improper conduct.”52  For 
example, in National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. City of St. Louis, the 
Missouri Supreme Court made clear that fraud and improper conduct 
were exceptions to the rule: 
Except where it is otherwise provided by statute it is 
held by the great preponderance of adjudged cases that, 
where one under a mistake of law, or in ignorance of 
law, but with full knowledge of all the facts, and in the 
absence of fraud or improper conduct upon the part of 
                                                 
45 512 P.2d 1251, 1252 (N.M. 1973). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1252–53. 
48 Id. at 1253. 
49 See Wheeler v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 91 N.W. 890, 890 (Minn. 1902). 
50 See supra Part II.B (discussing early American cases where the VPD could not be used 
to bar recovery when intentional wrongdoers profited from their illegal actions). 
51 See Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 56 (1838); Hunt v. 
Rousmanier’s Adm’rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174, 211 (1823). 
52 Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co. v. City of St. Louis, 40 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. 1931). 
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the payee, voluntarily and without compulsion pays 
money on a demand not legally enforceable against him, 
he can not [sic] recover it back.53 
Many states followed the “fraud or improper conduct” 
formulation.54  Thus, the traditional formulation of the VPD limited its 
application to situations in which there was no improper conduct on the 
part of the payee.55  Therefore, a payor-plaintiff was not necessarily 
required to have a colorable claim for common law fraud against the 
payee-defendant to come within the protection of this exception.56  Huch 
I called this rule into question where the court held that claims of 
consumer fraud were not sufficient to defeat the VPD defense.57 
3. Duress 
A payor who is under compulsion or duress at the time of payment 
may recover such payment from the payee if the payee was the source of 
the duress.58  Duress traditionally consists of a threat by a party to do 
something that he has no legal right to do.59  Courts have held that 
duress undermines the voluntary nature of the payment.60  The decisions 
in many of these early cases focused on the unequal bargaining power 
between the two parties and the violation of basic public policy that 
results from retaining monies paid under duress.61 
By and large, the degree of coercion necessary to prevent the 
application of the VPD decreased over time.62  In other words, alleged 
                                                 
53 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 19 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Neb. 1945); see, e.g., Evans v. Gale, 17 N.H. 573, 575 (1845); 
Craig v. Lininger, 61 Pa. Super. 339, 343 (1915); Nelson v. Swenson, 124 A. 468, 468–69 (R.I. 
1924); Hawkinson v. Conniff, 334 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash. 1959). 
55 See, e.g., Pingree v. Mut. Gas Co., 65 N.W. 6, 7 (Mich. 1895) (holding that “artifice, 
fraud, or deception” are exceptions). 
56 State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“It is 
not necessary in order to establish ‘unlawful practice’ [under Missouri’s Merchandising 
Practices Act (“MMPA”)] to prove the elements of common law fraud.”). 
57 See Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *9 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2008). 
58 Smith v. Prime Cable of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
59 28 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:26 (4th ed. 2003). 
60 See, e.g., Galesburg & Great E. R.R. Co. v. West, 108 Ill. App. 504, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1903) (describing a transaction, which “is attended by a degree of financial coercion or 
business duress which deprives the transaction of every vestige of a voluntary payment”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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victims of duress are offered more protection today than in the past.63  
Indeed, many courts did not take long to expand the duress exception 
beyond threats of physical harm to include moral duress,64 
business/economic duress,65 and legal duress,66 which can be less than 
the threat of criminal prosecution.67  For example, in Albany v. Abbott,68 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that because “[t]he law 
properly regards the lender on usury as the oppressor, and the borrower 
as the oppressed, and therefore will not treat the payment of usurious 
interest as a voluntary payment,” the borrower in usury is entitled to 
recover the illegal interest.69 
C. Modern Trends 
Despite the general trend toward more exceptions and less frequent 
application of the VPD during most of the twentieth century, the VPD 
remained a sometimes valid and viable defense, even though its 
parameters were somewhat unclear. 
By the early 1990s, the VPD had not yet been tested against the 
increasingly ubiquitous consumer fraud statutes and consumer class 
actions.  In its first outings it fared well, however, showing renewed 
usage and vitality when cable companies that were being sued for unfair 
and deceptive practices began pleading the VPD as an affirmative 
defense.70  In several cases, courts recognized the defense, and in some of 
the first examples, entire classes of claims were swept away as a result.71  
                                                 
63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (1981) (“Courts first 
recognized [duress] as improper threats of physical violence and later included wrongful 
seizure or detention of goods.”). 
64 See Ark. Natural Gas Co. v. Norton Co., 263 S.W. 775, 778 (Ark. 1924); Standard Box 
Co. v. Mut. Biscuit Co., 10 Cal. App. 746, 761 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909); Rees v. Schmits, 164 
Ill. App. 250, 258 (1911); Niedermeyer v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo. App. 654, 660 
(1895); Albany v. Abbott, 61 N.H. 157, 158 (1881). 
65 See Ark. Natural Gas Co., 263 S.W. at 778; Am. Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 192 S.W. 
402, 403 (Mo. 1917) (en banc). 
66 See City of Maysville v. Melton, 42 S.W. 754, 755 (Ky. 1897); Cox v. Welcher, 36 N.W. 
69, 69 (Mich. 1888); Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Begley, 252 S.W. 76, 78 (Mo. 1923) (en banc); 
Forrest v. Mayor of New York, 13 Abb. Pr. 350, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861). 
67 See Newberry v. City of Detroit, 150 N.W. 838, 839–40 (Mich. 1915) (holding that a 
taxpayer who paid an illegal tax after a lien was placed on his land was under legal duress, 
and therefore entitled to recover the amount of tax paid). 
68 61 N.H. at 158. 
69 Id. 
70 See Telescripps Cable Co. v. Welsh, 542 S.E.2d 640, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Dillon v. 
U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (N.Y. 2003); 
McWethy v. Telecomms., Inc., 988 P.2d 356, 357–58 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999); Putnam v. Time 
Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P’ship, 649 N.W.2d 626, 637 (Wis. 2002). 
71 See cases cited supra note 70. 
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Although each case had a slightly different set of facts, a common theme 
emerged.  The cable companies asserted that the VPD barred recovery 
because even if the fees were illegal, the customers did not identify the 
fee and challenge it before paying.  The companies argued that the 
ability to discover the fee, and payment in the face of at least that 
potential knowledge, equaled a voluntary payment with full knowledge 
of the facts.72  Just like that, the VPD resurfaced as a renewed tool of 
choice for defendants who have allegedly cheated customers.  The caveat 
emptor tone of the court decisions signified a potential erosion of 
consumer rights. 
In addition to the cable companies mentioned above, several other 
corporate defendants have utilized the VPD as a defense to consumer 
class action claims.  They also prevailed.  For example, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that customers were at fault for not 
inquiring about an illegal sales tax that Ameritech, a telecommunications 
company, was collecting contrary to state statutes.  As a result, the VPD 
eliminated the customers’ right to seek recovery.73  The cell phone 
industry followed, prevailing in a 2007 decision in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington striking down a 
class action challenging extra-contractual and undisclosed surcharges in 
cell phone bills.74  The string of consumer defeats continued with similar 
holdings in New York and Texas.75  As a result, in the years just before 
Huch I, the VPD had become a staple corporate defense—a ready-made 
antique doctrine that could excuse even fraudulent billing.  Huch I was 
an extension of these decisions, holding that consumers had no recourse 
against even the per se illegal charges if the consumer did not discover 
them in the first instance, refuse to pay, and file a claim.76 
III.  HUCH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
A. The Rise of the UDAP Statutes 
Statutory protection for consumers, in the form of UDAP provisions, 
started with the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 (“FTC Act”).77  
The FTC Act banned deceptive acts and practices and became the 
template for many of the state-based consumer protection statutes 
                                                 
72 See cases cited supra note 70.  
73 See Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 727 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
74 See Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C06-1325Z, 2007 WL 3407137 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 9, 2007). 
75 See Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., No. 06 Civ. 9960(HB), 2007 WL 927198, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 27, 2007); Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 876–88 (Tex. 2005). 
76  See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Huch I). 
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
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spanning several decades, including the 1960s and 1970s.78  The rise of 
these state-based UDAP statutes is significant for two reasons:  (1) the 
original FTC Act did not allow for state or private enforcements; and (2) 
these state statutes curb the doctrine of caveat emptor, in the process 
establishing a level of fairness in the marketplace.79  By enacting these 
statutes, legislators sought to offer consumers broad protection from a 
wide range of dishonest and abusive business practices.  Courts tend to 
guard the UDAP provisions and draft them with broad applicability to 
the extent that “[a]lmost any abusive business practice aimed at 
consumers is at least arguably a UDAP violation.”80  Nowadays, every 
state in the union has some sort of legislation designed to address unfair 
and deceptive acts and practices.81 
Missouri’s UDAP statute is called the Missouri Merchandising 
Practices Act (“MMPA”).82  It was designed to protect consumers and to 
preserve fundamental honesty, fair play, and right dealings in public 
transactions.83  The MMPA was enacted in 1967 as a shield against 
predatory business practices and as a supplement to the preexisting 
common-law fraud cause of action; it is broad in purpose, language, and 
application.84  The Missouri Supreme Court has described the definition 
of an unfair practice as “all-encompassing and exceedingly broad.  For 
                                                 
78 See Brief for Gateway Legal Servs., Inc. et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellants, Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2009) (No. SC 89361), 
available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/0/59519718166b0a8d862574cc0074 
3185/$FILE/SC89361_Gateway_Legal_Services_Amicus_Brief.pdf (noting that the UDAP 
“statutory provisions are enforced in all 50 states . . . [and] were enacted in the 1960s and 
1970s”). 
79 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (7th ed. 
2008). 
80 Id. at 2.  For example, New York prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct 
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.”  N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2011); see also State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 
633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“It is the defendant’s conduct, not his intent, which 
determines whether a violation has occurred.”); Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra 
Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 18 (Wash. 2007) (construing Washington UDAP statute 
as prohibiting acts and practices that have the mere “capacity” to deceive, and rejecting any 
intent requirement (emphasis omitted)). 
81 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 79, at 1033–54. 
82 MO. REV. STAT. § 407.010–407.1129 (2006 & Supp 2012). 
83 See Ports Petroleum Co. of Ohio v. Nixon, 37 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Mo. 2001) (en banc); 
State ex rel. Nixon v. Cont’l Ventures Inc., 84 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State ex 
rel. Ashcroft v. Mktg. Unlimited of Am., Inc., 613 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Brief 
for the Attorney Gen. of Mo. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Huch v. Charter 
Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2009) (No. SC 89361), 2008 WL 3852934. 
84 Brief for the Attorney Gen. of Mo., supra note 83, at 6. 
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better or worse, the literal words cover every practice imaginable and 
every unfairness to whatever degree.”85 
B. U.S. Trends on the Eve of Huch I 
Some statutes explicitly eliminate the VPD as a defense.86  In other 
words, the payor may obtain relief even if he or she made the payment 
voluntarily and with full knowledge of all the facts.  Even in the absence 
of explicit statutory preclusion of the VPD, however, courts have often 
found the defense to be incompatible with the broad protection intended 
to be provided by consumer protection statutes and have refused to 
allow it as a defense.87  One example is the Supreme Court of 
Washington stating that “the [VPD] is inappropriate as an affirmative 
defense in the CPA [(“Consumer Protection Act”)] context, as a matter of 
law, because we construe the CPA liberally in favor of plaintiffs.”88  
Additionally, both of Tennessee’s appellate courts and the Indiana 
Supreme Court have similarly held that the VPD will not bar consumer 
claims against businesses that destroy marketplace confidence and 
operate as predators in violation of UDAP statutes.89 
In Pratt v. Smart Corp.,90 a patient brought a claim to recover 
payment under the Medical Records Act for excessive fees paid for 
obtaining medical records from a copy company, and the company 
raised the VPD as an affirmative defense.91  The Tennessee Court of 
Appeals stated definitively that “the [s]tate has an interest in transactions 
that involve violations of statutorily-defined public policy, and, 
generally speaking, in such situations, the voluntary payment rule will 
not be applicable.”92  The court continued, stating that “where public 
policy has been established by a legislative enactment, a transaction that 
is violative of that policy is subject to inquiry even though it may be fully 
                                                 
85 Nixon, 37 S.W.3d at 240. 
86 See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a) (West 2006) (“A creditor who contracts for, 
charges, or receives interest that is greater than the amount authorized by this subtitle in 
connection with a transaction for personal, family, or household use is liable to the 
obligor.”). 
87 See, e.g., MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007) 
(explaining VPD does not bar statutory causes of action in New York); Indoor 
Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 24 (Wash. 2007) 
(holding that “the [VPD] is inappropriate as an affirmative defense” to Washington’s 
Consumer Protection Act). 
88 Indoor Billboard, 170 P.3d at 24. 
89 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind. 2004); Pratt v. 
Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). 
90 968 S.W.2d at 868. 
91 Id. at 869–71. 
92 Id. at 872. 
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consummated.”93  The court noted that in its case law, the VPD “does not 
come into play in situations involving a transaction that violates public 
policy,” thus reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and 
dismantling the VPD on such claims.94  New York, Illinois, and Indiana 
followed Tennessee’s trend, with the latter stating that “we do not 
believe that it is appropriate as a matter of policy for us to favor a private 
enterprise over private individuals,” thereby stripping the VPD as a 
defense to a class action against a cable company for excessive late fees.95 
C. The Facts of Huch 
In a Missouri-based class action suit, plaintiffs James Huch and Ryan 
Carstens alleged that the defendant cable company, Charter, committed 
a deceptive and unfair business practice by sending an unsolicited 
channel guide to its customers and charging for the guide without 
notifying the customers that it had been added to their bill.96  Plaintiffs 
brought suit under the MMPA, section 407.025, which enables 
consumers who have suffered a loss stemming from an unlawful, unfair, 
or unethical business practice (as defined in section 407.200), which 
affected their purchase or lease of merchandise.97  Specifically, plaintiffs 
asserted that Charter had failed to give customers the option to receive 
the guide despite it not being included in the monthly rate; sent the 
guide unsolicited to customers; failed to disclose the charges as they 
were added to the monthly bill; and charged each customer three dollars 
every month for this merchandise.98  In support of their allegations, 
plaintiffs cited two sources of law that made sending unsolicited 
merchandise an illegal act per se.99  Plaintiffs sought class certification, 
damages, and an injunction prohibiting defendant from engaging in 
further unfair and deceptive trade practices.100 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Ind. 2004); see Brown v. 
SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2007 WL 684133 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007); 
MacDonnell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007) (barring the VPD 
when plaintiffs assert a statutory cause of action). 
96 Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 723, 725 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.025, 407.200 (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 60-8.060 (2011)). 
100 Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 723. 
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D. Procedural History 
At the trial court level, Charter moved to dismiss the claim, citing the 
VPD as a defense.101  The trial court granted the motion and dismissed 
the claim with prejudice on May 21, 2007.102  In its rationale, the trial 
court stated that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the additional 
charges and, without evidence of mistake or duress, the VPD precluded 
recovery.103 
On April 15, 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the 
motion to dismiss the claim in an opinion that outlined some of the 
historic reasons for the VPD.104  The court of appeals stated that when a 
customer pays a fee, even if it is unfair or improper, payment operates as 
a waiver to any suit, claim, or recovery for a plaintiff class.105  The 
appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ citations to cases from other 
states, which held that the VPD affirmative defense was against public 
policy, and many of the Missouri cases cited in the brief lacked merit and 
were “not on point.”106  Further, the court concluded that the MMPA’s 
statutory framework allowed affirmative defenses such as the VPD.  The 
court cited a 1923 Missouri Supreme Court case that preceded the 
MMPA by more than forty years.107  Finally, despite the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the alleged conduct constituted consumer fraud and 
qualified under the fraud exception to the VPD, the court held that the 
plaintiffs had not properly pled the elements of common law fraud.  The 
court’s implication was clear:  Consumer fraud was not an exception to 
the VPD.  The court concluded that since the charges were in the 
plaintiffs’ bill, they knew or should have known of these charges.  
Therefore, the VPD precluded the claim and the court affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment.108  The plaintiffs petitioned for review, and the 
Missouri Supreme Court ordered transfer on June 24, 2008.109 
                                                 
101 Order and Judgment, Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06CC-3434, 2007 WL 
5086331, at A15 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 21, 2007).  
102 Id. at A16. 
103 Id. at A15. 
104 Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Apr. 15, 2008). 
105 Id. at *4. 
106 Id. at *5. 
107 Id. at *8 (citing Ferguson v. Butler Cnty., 247 S.W. 795, 796–97 (Mo. 1923)). 
108 Id. at *1. 
109 Huch v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 722 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
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E. Protect the Prey Not the Predators:  The Missouri Supreme Court’s Ruling 
The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, held that the VPD was not 
available as an affirmative defense to the defendant’s violations of the 
MMPA.  The court reversed the trial court decision on the grounds of 
public policy and legislative intent.110  The court based its rationale 
largely on the legislative intent, scope, and protections of the MMPA in 
disavowing certain legal principles, such as waiver and the VPD.111  
When considering legislative intent, the court stated that section 404.020 
of the MMPA was “intended . . . to ‘supplement the definitions of 
common law fraud in an attempt to preserve fundamental honesty, fair 
play and right dealings in public transactions.’”  Thus, the MMPA was 
enacted to protect consumers in modern commerce transactions in a 
paternalistic fashion.112  The court stated that the very nature of the 
MMPA and its language is clear and to be construed broadly.  It held 
that to effectuate the protections prescribed in the statute, certain legal 
principles are not available as defenses against consumer actions, 
including the VPD.113  The MMPA was designed to regulate consumer 
transactions in which businesses have superior access to resources, 
information, and remedies.  Therefore, the waiver-based common law 
VPD defense stands in direct conflict with the Missouri legislature’s 
intent.114  The legislature drafted and passed the MMPA to provide clear 
relief to consumers.  Concerting with this legislative intent, Missouri 
courts had already rejected various legal remedies under the MMPA 
before Huch, establishing a clear trend toward limiting affirmative 
defenses to MMPA-based claims to protect injured consumers.115  The 
court recognized “the Eighth Circuit[’s] . . . holding that the ‘public 
policy [behind the MMPA] is so strong that parties will not be allowed to 
waive its benefits,’” certifying the position that certain legal remedies are 
not available to protect consumers.116  The court also recognized this 
principle one year later, in High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp.117  It 
held that enforcing a contract’s forum selection clause was unreasonable 
and based its holding on a vital state interest in protecting local liquor 
distributors from questionable and unjustified termination of their 
                                                 
110 Id. at 727. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 724 (quoting State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 
368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). 
113 Id. at 725–26. 
114 Id. at 726–27. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 725–26 (quoting Elec. & Magneto Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int’l Corp., 941 F.2d 660, 
664 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
117 823 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
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franchises.118  In addition, the Huch court acknowledged the court’s 
holding in Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc. that an arbitration clause 
was unconscionable and unenforceable when clashing with unfair 
practices described in the MMPA, and recognized that not even estoppel 
is allowed as a defense to fraudulent conduct.119  These cases reinforce 
the position that the MMPA is protectionist for classes of consumers and 
that waiver under these claims is against state policy, state law, and 
renders all Missouri statutory MMPA law meaningless.120 
The Missouri Supreme Court responded to defendant’s argument 
that the VPD remained vital and preeminent by pointing out that in Eisel 
v. Midwest BankCentre it had already “held that the [VPD] is ‘not 
applicable in all situations.’”121  In Eisel, the consumers paid fees for 
document preparation, which the court found was an unauthorized 
practice of law, rendering the VPD unavailable to the defendant.122  The 
court specifically precluded the use of the VPD because the type of 
unfair and inequitable business practices outlined in the MMPA “are not 
subject to waiver, consent or lack of objection by the victim.”123  The 
court held that allowing the VPD to be used by corporate defendants 
profanely distributes the burden onto the least powerful and 
knowledgeable party and erodes the very protections the statute in 
question created for consumers.124 
The Missouri Supreme Court in Huch II applied these cases along 
with the legislative intent of the MMPA.  The court found that the 
defendant’s practices of sending the unsolicited program guide to the 
plaintiffs and charging them without notice, disclosure, or authorization 
was an unfair practice.125  The plaintiffs’ paying for the services under 
the VPD does not preclude the suit, and any usage of the VPD in a 
consumer class action under the MMPA is against public policy.126  
Moreover, the court held that the defendant’s use of the VPD as an 
affirmative defense was an attempt to undermine the very fabric of the 
consumer protection statute, and it defied clear Missouri legislative 
                                                 
118 Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 725. 
119 Id. at 726 (citing Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
120 Id. at 726–27. 
121 Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 339 
(Mo. 2007) (en banc)). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. (quoting Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 339) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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intent to protect both the consumers and business marketplace from 
unfair practices.127 
IV.  DOOMED:  THE IMPACT OF HUCH AND THE FUTURE OF THE VPD 
The VPD is a relic:  Bargaining power is institutionally and 
systematically slanted toward corporations; consumer statutes have 
increased the amount of protection available to consumers; and financial 
fraud has been present for decades.  Global trends, U.S. state court 
decisions, and recent corporate fraud scandals all argue for an end to the 
VPD and for the preservation of consumer rights. 
A. United Kingdom and Common Law World Abolishes the VPD 
The extermination of the VPD has already begun.  The very country 
that spawned the VPD’s existence two centuries ago has now abolished 
it because it is improper for modern jurisprudence.128  In the 1999 
landmark decision Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, the 
House of Lords in the United Kingdom held that “the mistake of law 
[VPD] can no longer be allowed to survive.”129  In Kleinwort, appellant 
banks had made payments to local authorities using interest swap 
transactions.  Both parties presumed these were proper transactions, but 
they were later voided by the House of Lords on ultra vires grounds.130  
Lord Goff established a three-prong rationale for destroying the two 
hundred year-old VPD doctrine:  (1) the VPD encourages unjust 
enrichment; (2) mistake of law and mistake of fact are no longer 
recognized as significant distinctions; and (3) judicial manipulation of 
the VPD to ensure variable results has left both the courts and litigants in 
a stream of unpredictable madness.131  Lord Berwick simply found the 
VPD to be “indefensible” to litigants of modest means and limited legal 
knowledge, noting that the very reason there is a cause of action for 
unjust enrichment is “because [the] law, unlike facts, can change.”132  The 
House of Lords concluded that the long history of the VPD had run its 
course and that the “rule . . . cannot sensibly survive in a [modern] rubric 
of the law.”133 Around the world, over sixty percent of common law 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
129 Id. at 373. 
130 Id. at 353–54. 
131 Id. at 372–73. 
132 Id. at 390–92. 
133 Id. at 373. 
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countries have already abolished the VPD.134  In its Kleinwort opinion, the 
House of Lords noted that several European countries including 
Germany, France, and Italy had already done away with their form of 
the VPD.135  Germany, France, and Italy shared a common fear of 
floodgate litigation as a result of lifting the VPD; however, the House of 
Lords noted there had been no flood or disruption of judicial economy.136  
Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Scotland abrogated the VPD 
judicially, and New Zealand abolished it by statute.137  In her article, 
Mistake of Law Rule Abrogated, Louisa Ho stated that soon the Hong Kong 
courts would follow the trend of eliminating the VPD, asserting that 
“[a]fter all, it has never been disputed that the default rules of restitution 
can be superseded by voluntary agreement.”138  There is a growing 
global consensus that the VPD doctrine has truly become an eighteenth 
century theory that has no place and purpose in twentieth century global 
jurisprudence. 
B. Current United States Status of the VPD 
Before Huch I, many states had either never allowed the VPD to 
come into existence or judicially overruled its usage.  As the twentieth 
century came to a close, so did the VPD in various courts across the 
nation.  These courts provided the rationale,139 policy,140 and foundation 
                                                 
134 See supra notes 77–79 (discussing the rise of UDAP provisions to protect consumers). 
135 Kleinwort, [1999] 2 A.C. at 374. 
136 Id. 
137 Aedit Abdullah, The Abrogation of the Rule Against Recovery in Mistake of Law, 1998 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469 (1998). 
138 Lusina Ho, Mistake of Law Rule Abrogated, H.K. LAW., Feb. 1999, at 34–35. 
139 See BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. 2005).  Even in states 
where the doctrine was once rigorously enforced, there has been a steady retreat.  Consider 
this statement from the Texas Supreme Court: 
[A]lthough the voluntary-payment rule may have been widely used by 
parties and some Texas courts at one time, its scope has diminished as 
the rule’s equitable policy concerns have been addressed through 
statutory or other legal remedies.  Indeed, this Court has affirmatively 
applied the rule only once in the last forty years, and that holding has 
itself been modified since. 
Id. 
140 Huch v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Mo. 2009); see Alvarez v. 
Pappas, 890 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ill. 2008) (explaining that the VPD is “often harsh in its 
application”); Getto v. City of Chicago, 426 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ill. 1981) (noting that the threat 
of shutting off phone service due to nonpayment of charges resulted in an obligation that 
would bar application of the VPD); see also Brisbane v. Dacres, (1813) 5 Taunt. 143, 147 
(explaining that retention by the recipient of monies paid by mistake is only proper where 
“it be consistent with honour and conscience to retain it”); S.L.C., Note, The Voluntary-
Payment Doctrine in Georgia, 16 GA. L. REV. 893, 916 (1982) (reiterating that Georgia relies on 
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for what became Huch II.141  The requiem for the VPD had begun, and 
the Missouri Supreme Court was not alone in valuing consumer 
protection and legislative intent over the shifty and rogue VPD defense. 
1. The Aftermath of Huch II in United States Courts 
Huch II has already inspired three states to revisit their position on 
the VPD in the past year.  Georgia, Nevada, and Washington have 
followed Huch II by removing the VPD as a defense to consumer class 
action lawsuits and noting that the protections of the legislature override 
vague common law defenses like the VPD.142  In McGinnis v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc.,143 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington stated that the VPD is inapplicable to class actions based on 
the CPA about hidden international charges in customers’ phone bills.  
This January 2010 decision reinforced a 2007 Supreme Court of 
Washington ruling, which held the VPD was an inappropriate defense 
given the purpose of the CPA.144  The Supreme Court of Georgia, in 
March 2010, proclaimed that “the clear purpose of the Natural Gas Act is 
to protect natural gas consumers . . . [and that this] must prevail over the 
                                                                                                             
the unjust enrichment principles, rather than the VPD because it lacks clarity and 
uniformity). 
141 290 S.W.3d at 721; see Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind. 
2004) (providing one of the more striking examples of the expansion of the duress 
exception).  In Time Warner Entertainment Co., the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
VPD did not prevent the plaintiff-cable television customers from recovering late-fee 
payments in excess of the actual damages suffered by the cable company as a result of the 
late payments.  Id. at 893.  The court’s rationale was that the plaintiffs were forced into a 
situation where they had to make the payment to receive the property promised to them 
under the contract, i.e., their cable TV, whereas plaintiffs in similar cases where the VPD 
was applied had not been threatened with immediate deprivation of goods or services if 
they did not pay.  Id. at 891.  Recent history shows a movement away from the VPD.  See id. 
(noting that the old version of the Restatement of Restitution supports the VPD, the new 
draft of the Restatement “eliminates it”).  In some states, the VPD has been literally or 
virtually abandoned.  See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Nev. 
2010); McGinnis v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C08-106Z, 2010 WL 276230, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 20, 2010); Brown v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2007 WL 684133, at * 9 
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007); Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 691 S.E.2d 203, 205 (Ga. 
2010); Alvarez, 890 N.E.2d at 444 (explaining that the VPD is “often harsh in its 
application”); Getto, 426 N.E.2d at 850 (noting that the threat of shutting off phone service 
due to nonpayment of charges resulted in an obligation that would bar application of the 
VPD); Time Warner Entm’t Co., 802 N.E.2d at 892; MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 
N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007); Pratt v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1997); BMG Direct Mktg., Inc., 178 S.W.3d at 771.   
142 See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–24; McGinnis, No. C08-106Z, 2010 WL 276230, at *1; 
Southstar Energy Servs., LLC, 691 S.E.2d at 206. 
143 McGinnis, 2010 WL 276230, at *1. 
144 Id. 
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general . . . [VPD],” in response to a class action suit involving 
overpayments to a natural gas marketer.145  The court cited to Huch II 
and found that allowing the VPD as a defense would be “contrary to the 
intent of the legislature” and such protectionist private rights of action.146 
Sobel v. Hertz Corp., decided in late March 2010, strongly captured 
Huch II’s impact.  The Nevada District Court used Huch II as the very 
foundation to deny the VPD’s usage as an affirmative defense to a class 
action on airport concession fees.147  Despite otherwise finding that the 
Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act had not been violated, the court 
took it upon itself to thoroughly assess how Missouri’s rationale in 
supporting consumers over predatory business actions clearly precludes 
the usage of the VPD.148  Strangely enough, the defendant had relied 
upon the Missouri Appellate Western Court decision that found the VPD 
precluded a class action under the MMPA, and it argued that Nevada 
should follow that reasoning along with the reasoning in an 1887 
Nevada Supreme Court case supporting usage of the VPD.149  During 
litigation, the Missouri Supreme Court delivered the Huch II decision;  
the Nevada court denied the VPD defense after finding “the reasoning of 
Huch II and the cases in line with Huch II convincing . . . [to enforce] 
‘paternalistic legislation designed to protect those that could not 
otherwise protect themselves.’”150 
The actions of the Nevada, Georgia, and Washington courts illustrate 
that the era of the VPD defense against statutory-based consumer rights 
is over.  Furthermore, the VPD is already abolished or relegated to 
antiquity in at least seven states.151  The modern trend and post-Huch 
focus is to limit the VPD to common law claims and strip any affirmative 
defense against class actions where consumers are misled, deceived, or 
defrauded by corporations. 
                                                 
145 Southstar Energy Servs., 691 S.E.2d at 205. 
146 Id. at 206 (quoting Huch v. Charter Communications, 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1223–24. 
148 Id. at 1218, 1224. 
149 Id. at 1230; see also id. at 1222–23 (noting the defendant’s reliance on Huch I and a 
Nevada Supreme Court decision in 1887). 
150 Id. at 1223–24 (quoting Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009)). 
151 See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; McGinnis v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C08-106Z, 2010 
WL 276230, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2010); Brown v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777-
JPG, 2007 WL 684133, at * 9 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007); Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 
691 S.E.2d 203, 205 (Ga. 2010); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 
(Ind. 2004); MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007); Pratt 
v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). 
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V.  DERANGED:  THE USAGE OF THE VPD IN AN ERA OF CORPORATE GREED 
AND MARKET MELTDOWNS 
This is an era of corporate fraud, consumer fraud, and economic 
tension where public policy concerns warrant more protection for 
consumers.  Spanning the past decade, some of the most prominent and 
sophisticated entities in our business markets have engaged in an 
endless array of illegal conduct.152  Meanwhile, on the consumer-level, 
there is a staggering amount of new and refined frauds perpetrated on 
the American public.  These include identity fraud,153 a host of illegal 
activities regarding subprime loans,154 a growing number of debt 
adjusting scams,155 and rampant general consumer fraud ranging from 
deceptive advertising to “cramming” of charges on bills.156  The 
vulnerability of the American consumer increases as mass transactions 
conducted over long distances by phone, mail, fax, or internet become 
the norm.  In response to this, legislatures, based largely on the Federal 
Trade Commission’s policies regarding consumer fraud, have enacted 
more consumer statutes that enable recovery.157  As discussed, these 
statutes—often referred to collectively as “Little FTC Acts” or UDAP 
statutes—are designed to supplement common law fraud remedies, 
thereby providing a more flexible tool to hold companies accountable.158  
Most of these statutes provide for class actions, making certain that a 
company that extracts a few dollars from millions of consumers can still 
be held accountable despite the fact that an individual claim would make 
no economic sense. 
                                                 
152 Associated Press, Corporate Fraud Scandals Since 2002, U.S.A. TODAY (July 17, 2007, 4:46 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-07-17-3330759536_x.htm. 
153 FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE U.S.:  AN FTC SURVEY 8–9 (2004). 
154 JOINT ECON. COMM., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET CRISIS TIMELINE 1–2 (July 2008), 
available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc-
789f69131903. 
155 Credit-Repair Scams, MO. ATT’Y GEN. CHRIS KOSTER, http://ago.mo.gov/publications/ 
creditrepair.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2011); Frauds and Scams, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. GREG 
ABBOTT, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/consumer/scams.shtml (last updated Apr. 5, 2011); 
Frequently asked Questions—Debt Adjuster, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING AND INS., 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/banklicensing/debtadjusterfaq.html (last visited Jan. 13, 
2008); Herb Weisbaum, Debt Relief Deals ‘Preying on Consumer’s Trust’, MSNBC.COM, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18155301/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2007). 
156 Cramming:  Mystery Phone Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc. 
gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro18.shtm; Unauthorized, Misleading, or 
Deceptive Charges Placed on Your Telephone Bill—“Cramming”, FED. COMMC’N, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cramming.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
157 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 79, at 1–3. 
158 Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/6
2012] Death of the VPD 523 
It is true that corporate fraud and scandal is not exclusive to the 
twenty-first century, but the last decade has seen consumers—and the 
economy as a whole—damaged by schemes that once were only 
conceived of in movies and novels.159 In the world of 
telecommunications, WorldCom, after merging with MCI (one of the 
largest mergers to date), was found in 2000 to have committed fraud in 
under-representing line costs and inflating revenues in bogus accounting 
entries.160  This was only the beginning of a decade marked by ever 
larger scandals and collapses.  Immediately following WorldCom in 
2002, Fortune magazine’s “Most Admired” innovative energy company, 
Enron, completely imploded as the world learned of its illegal actions:  
bribing foreign officials, false accounting, and manipulating energy 
markets to artificially inflate electricity costs for consumers on the west 
coast of the United States.161  In 2002 alone, there were over twenty 
corporate scandals with illegal, fraudulent, and improper conduct from 
companies such as AOL Time Warner, Arthur Andersen, Duke Energy, 
Halliburton, Kmart, Qwest, Tyco, and Xerox, just to name a few.162  This 
massive pattern of fraud by parties that were sophisticated and 
entrusted with billions of dollars of securities, pensions, and employee 
livelihoods established the need for regulatory action.  The free market 
was not solving its own problems; it was drowning in greed.163  The 
corporate greed spilled over, or in some cases began, in the consumer 
markets.  Confidence scams and identity theft alone affect over 30 
million victims per year;164 there are nearly 10 million victims in the 
                                                 
159 BOILER ROOM (New Line Cinema 2000); FUN WITH DICK AND JANE (Colum. Pictures 
2005); WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). 
160 Susan Pulliam & Deborah Soloman, How Three Unlikely Sleuths Exposed Fraud at 
WorldCom:  Firm’s Own Employees Sniffed Out Cryptic Clues and Followed Hunches, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 30, 2002, 4:58 PM, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1035929943494003751.html. 
161 See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM:  THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); William W. Bratton, Enron and the 
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1357–59 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna 
G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2003); Tapes:  Enron Plotted to Shut Down 
Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3, 2005, 11:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/ 
enron.tapes/. 
162 Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30PM), 
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker_print.html. 
163 See JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL:  THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009); 
WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS:  A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL 
STREET (2009); SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD:  HEDGE FUNDS AND THE 
MAKING OF A NEW ELITE (2010); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:  THE INSIDE STORY 
OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM 
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
164 FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES:  THE SECOND FTC 
SURVEY S-1 (2007). 
Campbell and Beatty: Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.: Consumer Prey, Corporate Pr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
524 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
United States.165  The forms range from primitively deceptive to scams so 
complex that it takes several governmental agencies to put an end to the 
conduct.166  The fraud in the subprime market was almost too pervasive 
to recount.  While Wall Street companies invented derivatives and 
figured out ways to turn bundles of subprime loans into AAA rated 
securities, consumers were in the cross-hairs at the ground level.167  
Perpetrators committed an almost endless string of frauds to fuel Wall 
Street’s need for more subprime paper.168  Appraisers over-appraised 
homes; talking heads promised a housing market that would never 
decline; “liar loans” in which no documents are required to get a loan 
became the norm; 169 pre-payment penalties were imbedded in almost 
every loan; adjustable rates that could only go up (exploding ARMS) 
were buried in fine print; and companies like Countrywide and 
Ameriquest sponsored Super Bowls and other events while building a 
true house of cards grounded upon subprime loans.170   Therefore, to 
                                                 
165 See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 3 
(2007) (reporting 8.3 million fraud victims in 2005); Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos:  
Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2007) 
(explaining that technological advances have caused identity theft cases to soar); Kamaal 
Zaidi, Identity Theft and Consumer Protection:  Finding Sensible Approaches to Safeguard 
Personal Data in the United States and Canada, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 109–10 (2007) 
(explaining that there were 10 million reported cases of identity theft in 2004); Jennifer 
Lynch, Note, Identity Theft in Cyberspace:  Crime Control Methods and Their Effectiveness in 
Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 261 (2005) (reporting that 9.9 million 
Americans were victims in 2002). 
166 See De Armond, supra note 165, at 1078–79 (explaining typical identity theft cases); 
Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and Consumers:  Application of the 
FRCA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 584–86 (2002) (describing common types of 
identity theft); Thomas L. Friedman, Gonna Need a Bigger Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at 
12; ‘Malicious’ Mortgage Fraud:  More Than 400 Charged Nationwide, FBI (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june08/malicious_mortgage061908.html. 
167 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at UC Berkeley/UCLA 
Symposium:  The Mortg. Meltdown, the Econ., and Pub. Policy (Oct., 31 2008). 
168 Id.; see Associated Press, FBI Investigating Potential Fraud by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Lehman, AIG, FOX NEWS (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933, 
426783,00.html; Chris Arnold, Former Ameriquest Workers Tell of Deception, NPR (May 14, 
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10165859. 
169 Bob Ivry, Subprime ‘Liar Loans’ Fuel Bust with $1 Billion Fraud (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 25, 2007, 4:21PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aN2DPRuRs93M. 
170 See Ameriquest Accused of ‘Boiler Room’ Tactics, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 5, 2005), 
http://educationcenter2000.com/Articles_Folder/Ameriquest.htm; Kevin Bohn, FBI Probes 
Countrywide for Possible Fraud, CNN MONEY (Mar. 8, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/ 
03/08/news/companies/countrywide_FBI/?postversion=2008031003; Chris Isidore, ‘Liar 
Loans’:  Mortgage woes beyond subprime, CNNMONEY (Mar. 18, 2007, 5:01 pm), 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/news/economy/next_subprime/index.htm.  See 
generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:  INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) 
(describing the rampant frauds that occurred in the early 2000s). 
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say consumer fraud is rampant is probably an understatement.  In the 
last major FTC study on fraud using national data in 2005, there was a 
reported level of “48.7 million incidents” of fraud on consumers.171  
Consumers’ trust in products, companies, and services has waned as the 
scams and predators have grown.172  Although it is fair to suggest that 
consumer confidence is largely eroded by economic conditions, one 
cannot discount the effect perpetual reports of fraud have on consumer 
confidence indices.173   According to the FTC, the top scams are 
“weight-loss products,” “foreign lotteries,” “prize promotions,” and 
“work-at-home programs.”174  Far more disturbing is the population 
segment that is targeted.  Data suggests that those hit hardest tend to be 
those with less education and lower income.  In some cases, consumer 
fraud targets those who have already been defrauded with over 11.7 
million people being preyed on by more than one scheme.175  Common 
examples include loan restructuring, credit refinancing, or debt 
consolidation scams that take an already-vulnerable and financially 
damaged party, promise them help, and then catapult them into 
complete bankruptcy and desperation.176 
Against even this cursory look at an ocean of fraudulent behavior, it 
is evident there is no place for the VPD in modern consumer 
transactions.  The VPD rests upon the premise that a party may 
sometimes keep illegal gains because the other party knew it was 
overpaying (or at least could have known) and paid anyway.  There is no 
place for the “finders keepers” mentality fostered by the VPD in today’s 
fast-paced world where consumers battle with sophisticated companies 
and billing occurs through mass mailings, online bill payments, and 
credit card swipes.  As noted in the amicus brief for Huch II, the demise 
of the VPD has correlated with a rise in protectionist statutes passed by 
states for their resident consumers.177  Legislatures throughout the 
country have made clear that in a market in which bargaining power has 
                                                 
171 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 164, at S-1. 
172 Lauren L. Sullins, Comment, “Phishing” for a Solution:  Domestic and International 
Approaches to Decreasing Online Identity Theft, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 397, 403 (2006) 
(explaining that as scams such as phishing increase consumer confidence decreases); 
American’s Consumer Confidence in Sharp Decline, BLOOMBERG.COM, http://www.bloomberg. 
com/apps/data?pid=avimage&iid=i.hcOXt8LDF4 (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
173 United States Consumer Confidence, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.trading 
economics.com/united-states/consumer-confidence (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
174 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 164, at S-1–S-2. 
175 See id. at 15 (“11.7 million [victims] experienced one or both of the two more general 
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176 Id. at 53. 
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Campbell and Beatty: Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.: Consumer Prey, Corporate Pr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
526 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
shifted considerably into the hands of the corporations and modern 
merchants, there must be meaningful remedies for harmed consumers.  
The profit motive is amoral, not immoral, and the legal structure must 
make certain that economic incentives encourage playing by the rules, 
not cheating.  Legislatures recognize this, and through the creation of 
UDAP statutes, they have placed the economic incentives squarely on 
playing by the rules by ensuring that businesses can face claims that 
could cost them actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.  
This creates a level playing field for consumers and businesses, and in 
doing so allows consumers to trust that they can spend freely. 
The VPD is antithetical to these ideals and stands as an antiquated 
doctrine in today’s modern world.  It is almost an absurd concept that in 
the twenty-first century a consumer who was the victim of fraud, or even 
negligent billing by a powerful corporation, would be barred from 
recovery simply because she did not immediately catch the deception or 
mistake.  Yet, the VPD demands that outcome.  It is a license to steal in 
an era of powerful thieves that, if allowed, would eradicate far too many 
consumer claims.  The VPD places an economic incentive on tack-on 
charges or excessive fees, and in doing so, is antithetical to the intent of 
the legislatures and the express will of the people. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The courts, the legislatures, and even the very country that spawned 
the VPD have started the funeral procession for the VPD.  As the House 
of Lords and several U.S. state supreme courts have stated, the VPD has 
no place in modern jurisprudence.  The VPD was born in an era of 
commerce and mercantilism when the consumer may have known as 
much as or more than the seller and deals were carried out face to face 
over a handshake.  Thus, the VPD is outdated and ill-suited to the 
modern, mass transaction, automated world.  Small predatory 
companies litter the marketplace, buying information from third parties 
to create schemes that are streamlined to leave consumers with nothing.  
Huge monoliths of the business world actively engage in sophisticated 
fraud that leaves stock markets crashed, gatekeepers and regulators 
astounded or indicted, and the American consumer at risk.  Although 
many critics may call for deregulation and Keynesian adherence to the 
idea that markets, sacred and perfect with minimal governmental 
regulation, will protect consumers, it is time to put such quaint ideas 
aside.  Markets will work, but only when hard work and fair dealing are 
guaranteed a reward, and slight-of-hand and carelessness are 
guaranteed to cost money.  Strong consumer remedies must be part of 
the antidote to the growing wave of fraud.  The VPD threatens these 
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simple ideals, and as such, must be fully eliminated from the consumer 
realm for the good of the market, including all of its participants. 
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